We caught a rattlesnake.
I go back and forth. My opinions are like gossamer, especially on the subject of music and movies, etc. But the current state of my thinking is that "(Nothing But) Flowers" by the Talking Heads is the perfect pop song. Absolutely sublime in every way. I was inspired to think about this by reading Math Rock's post on perfection. Like him, I don't think many things are perfect. 2001, perhaps. But this song is the perfect pop song. Absolutely. Absolutely perfect.
Now, this is not the same thing as saying that it's the best. It is merely saying that it is unsullied in anyway. This does not preclude any other songs from being unsullied; that would simply imply that it is of the same quality as "(Nothing But) Flowers". But it does imply that there are no pop songs that are better than "(Nothing But) Flowers", because something's being better than something else implies that the former makes up for some deficiency in the latter, the existence of which I deny in the case of "(Nothing But) Flowers". Of course, it might be the case that "better than" is intransitive, in which case you could have "(Nothing But) Flowers" better than some other song, which is better than some third song, which is then, in turn, better than "(Nothing But) Flowers". But a pairwise comparison between the third song and "(Nothing But) Flowers" would have to retain the deficiency made-up-for relation, which I deny is possible in the case of "(Nothing But) Flowers".
I wonder if this has implications for normative aesthetics? It is surely a truism that one oughtn't to listen to "(Nothing But) Flowers" every chance one gets; listening to other songs is OK, too. But this seems to imply that, at least in the case of normative aesthetics, the right is not determined by the maximization of the good. Is there such a thing as normative aesthetics? Somehow I doubt it. Aesthetics seems to me to be the kind of thing that is concerned solely with the good. Comment withdrawn.
End transmission.
Now, this is not the same thing as saying that it's the best. It is merely saying that it is unsullied in anyway. This does not preclude any other songs from being unsullied; that would simply imply that it is of the same quality as "(Nothing But) Flowers". But it does imply that there are no pop songs that are better than "(Nothing But) Flowers", because something's being better than something else implies that the former makes up for some deficiency in the latter, the existence of which I deny in the case of "(Nothing But) Flowers". Of course, it might be the case that "better than" is intransitive, in which case you could have "(Nothing But) Flowers" better than some other song, which is better than some third song, which is then, in turn, better than "(Nothing But) Flowers". But a pairwise comparison between the third song and "(Nothing But) Flowers" would have to retain the deficiency made-up-for relation, which I deny is possible in the case of "(Nothing But) Flowers".
I wonder if this has implications for normative aesthetics? It is surely a truism that one oughtn't to listen to "(Nothing But) Flowers" every chance one gets; listening to other songs is OK, too. But this seems to imply that, at least in the case of normative aesthetics, the right is not determined by the maximization of the good. Is there such a thing as normative aesthetics? Somehow I doubt it. Aesthetics seems to me to be the kind of thing that is concerned solely with the good. Comment withdrawn.
End transmission.
posted by dd0031 at 3:41 PM
4 Comments:
You know, the similarities/differences between ethics and aesthetics is a subject I'm beginning to find compelling. Initially, I'm inclined to dispute your claim that there isn't any such thing as normative aesthetics.
1. While your example appears to show that it's not A-right to maximize the A-good, it might only go for maximally consuming the A-good. It could still be the case that it's A-right to maximally produce the A-good.
2. It seems like "amounts of goodness" don't accrue in the aesthetic realm like they do in the ethical realm. As you point out, it's clear that we shouldn't over-experience an A-good thing. So maybe the lesson there is that maximizing the A-good means being careful to attend to the diminishing returns such goods provide, such that one receives the maximum aesthetic experience.
2a. A possibly clarificatory analogy: consider the claim that one can never have too much fun. If someone tells me "no, everything loses its fun after too much exposure," I can say that they don't understand how fun accrues. Since too much of a fun thing - roller-coasters, maybe - ceases to be fun, one can only have fun up to some ceiling of fun. This isn't too much fun; it's fun to the point of saturation.
3. On a different tack, what about someone who eats instant mashed potatoes constantly, to the point of outright refusing the genuine kind when offered? Wouldn't we say this person is irrational? Isn't that some indication that there are A-right acts - in this case, opting for the genuine mash?
possibly clarificatory addendum to 2a - the problem in this case is not that I've had too much fun, it's that I've had too many roller-coaster rides.
1. Good point. Hadn't thought of that.
2. I think this point applies in ethics as well. The roller coster ride is instrumental in producing fun experiences, but it should not be identified as the fun. After a few too many rides, it ceases to be instrumentally good, but this shows nothing about the claim "you should have as much fun as possible." I think perhaps this is compatible with everything you're saying.
3. I think that depends upon what stance you take. I'm not up on my metaaesthetics, but perhaps it's the case that aesthetic experiences are judged, you know, psudeo-hedonically, in which case you wouldn't be able to say that the instant-eater is irrational. Perhaps there's a more objective, psuedo-perfectionist standard, which claims that there are objective aesthetic goods that one needs to consume.
In any event, I suppose you're right that there is a sort of normative aesthetics. I wonder if it isn't just an application of ethics...
Problems of repeat aesthetic experiences in maximizing aesthetic good have played an important role in aesthetic theory. See Kierkegaard's essay "On Crop Rotation."
Also, I think the hedonic judging isn't incompatible with an objective, perfectionist standard. There are many things that are objectively more pleasurable than other things, and people who disagree are clouded by inappropriate biases. Doesn't Mill deal with this issue? Though the hedonic measure is surely too simple. Many highly aesthetic experiences are the opposite of pleasurable. They can be depressing, heart-wrenching, disgusting, or painful.
Post a Comment
<< Home